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LAIRD v. NELMS: A CALL FOR REVIEW AND
REVISION OF THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS
ACT
by Cornelius J. Peck*
Courts upon occasion perform a catalytic function with respect to
the legislative process. They may perform that function by expressly
directing attention to matters requiring the enactment of legislation,'
or by making observations which prick the conscience of legislators
who have been indifferent to the demands of a changing society. 2
Courts inadvertently may perform a catalytic function by rendering a
decision so unacceptable that legislative response becomes a necessity.
In this latter way, the unfortunate decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States in Laird v. Nelms3 may provoke congressional con-
sideration of the Federal Tort Claims Act and produce needed revi-
sion of that act.
The Court's decision unnecessarily imposes upon the Act an inter-
pretation which fails to distribute equitably the inevitable cost of gov-
ernment. If the implications of the language of the majority opinion
are pursued, the Government will be immune from many traditional
and well established tort liabilities. Predicated upon an assumption
that the judiciary is incapable of correcting its own errors, the deci-
sion is sadly out of keeping with the creative role appellate courts
have played in recent years in reforming tort law for our changing
society.4
This article will evaluate Laird v. Nelms in its historical context,
criticizing the Court's rationale and outlining the problems it creates.
Laird v. Nelms provides the stimulus for both the subsequent discus-
sion of the justification for strict liability under the FTCA and the
* Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.S., Harvard, 1944; Certificate,
Harvard Business School, 1945; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1949.
1. See, e.g., Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795
(1962).
2. Lewis, The Supreme Court and Its Critics, 45 MINN. L. REV. 305, 315, 317 (1961).
3. 406 U.S. 797 (1972).
4. R. KEETON, VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE: REFORMING PAIVATE LAW (1969). Peck,
The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REV.
365 (1963). Cf. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 165-166 (1963).
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essential revisions to the FTCA proposed to alleviate the problems
created by the Court's decision.
I. THE DECISION IN LAIRD v. NELMS
Laird v. Nelms was decided by a vote of six to two,5 with the ma-
jority opinion written by Justice Rehnquist. Justice Stewart, with
whom Justice Brennan joined, dissented. Rejecting the plaintiffs as-
sertion of a right to recover under a principle of North Carolina law
imposing absolute liability upon one who engages in an ultrahazard-
ous activity, the majority held that the United States could not be
held liable under the FTCA for damage done to the plaintiff's house
by the sonic boom of an Air Force plane absent proof of negligence.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, relying upon its earlier
decision in United States v. Praylou,6 had reached the contrary con-
clusion, finding nothing in the FTCA which would bar recovery upon
that basis. 7
The plaintiffs thought it proper to base their theory of recovery on
North Carolina law because the FTCA provides that the United States
shall be liable for injuries to persons or property: 8
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employees
of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or em-
ployment, under circumstances where the United Stafes, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of
the place where the act or omission occurred.
The commitment of governmental liability to principles of local state
tort law is repeated in another section:9
The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of the title
relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for
interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.
5. Justice Douglas heard argument but withdrew from participation in considera-
tion or decision of the case.
6. 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 315 (1954). For a discussion
of Praylou, see note 18 infra.
7. Nelms v. Laird, 442 F.2d 1163 (4th Cir. 1971).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970) (emphasis added).
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Although this statutory language clearly indicates that the predomi-
nant purpose of the FTCA is to make state law determinative of what
constitutes a "wrongful" act, the Court substituted a highly technical
reading of the statute and assumed that its brand of federal common
law controlled.' 0
II. PRIOR CASE LAW: THE COURT'S OPTIONS
The question of whether the United States might be held liable
under the FTCA on a theory of strict or absolute liability had received
attention from the Supreme Court of the United States in 1953 when
the Court decided the case of Dalehite v. United States." Dalehite
was the test case for determining the liability of the United States for
the damage done at Texas City by the explosion of fertilizer grade
ammonium nitrate which had been manufactured for the United
States according to its specifications and under its control. A majority
of four justices held that, even assuming the correctness of the trial
court's findings of causal negligence on the part of the Government,
recovery was barred by the discretionary function exception of the
Act.12 In a much quoted passage, Justice Reed said for the majority:' 3
It is unnecessary to define, apart from this case, precisely where dis-
cretion ends. It is enough to hold, as we do, that the "discretionary
function or duty" that cannot form a basis for suit under the Tort
Claims Act includes more than the initiation of programs and activ-
10. This strained construction only can be derived by interpreting the FTCA to
mean that only if an act is "wrongful" according to federal common law does one ex-
amine state law to determine whether the government would also be liable under that
body of law. According to this theory, state law is only relevant after an initial determi-
nation of governmental liability under federal common law. This unspoken premise of
the Court's rationale seems incongruous with the FTCA's rather clear preference for
state law. See text accompanying notes 49-54 infra. Other fallacies in the majority
opinion besides this overly technical reading of the FTCA are considered in the section
entitled "Laird v. Nelms: The Court's Rationale," infra.
11. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1970) provides: "The provisions of this chapter and section
1346(b) of this title shall not apply to-
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a fed-
eral agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion in-
volved be abused."
13. 346 U.S. at 35-36.
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ities. It also includes determinations made by executives or adminis-
trators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations.
Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discre-
tion. It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out the
operations of government in accordance with official directions cannot
be actionable. If it were not so, the protection of § 2680(a) would fail
at the time it would be needed, that is when a subordinate performs or
fails to perform a causal step, each action or nonaction being directed
by the superior, exercising, perhaps abusing, discretion.
Having disposed of the argument to impose liability on the basis of
specific and general findings of negligence, the majority turned its at-
tention to what it termed "some slight residue of theory of absolute
liability without fault," which it found reflected in the trial court's
finding that the fertilizer constituted a nuisance and in the contention
of the petitioners before the Court. 14 Said the majority:' 5
We agree with the six judges of the Court of Appeals ... that the Act
does not extend to such situations, though of course well known in tort
law generally. It [the Act] is to be invoked only on a "negligent or
wrongful act or omission" of an employee. Absolute liability, of
course, arises irrespective of how the tortfeasor conducts himself; it is
imposed automatically when any damages are sustained as a result of
the decision to engage in the dangerous activity. The degree of care
used is irrelevant to the application of that doctrine. But the statute
requires a negligent act. It is our judgment that liability does not arise
by virtue either of United States ownership of an "inherently dan-
gerous commodity" or of engaging in an "extra-hazardous" activity.
The Dalehite majority's rejection of strict liability under the FTCA
obtained apparent agreement from the three dissenters, who had dis-
agreed vigorously with the majority on other questions but took no
exception to the above-quoted statement.16
With the exception of the Fourth Circuit, every court of appeals to
which the question has been brought has concluded that it was obli-
gated to follow the Dalehite construction of the Act and rule that the
FTCA does not permit recovery based on the doctrine of strict or ab-
14. 346U.S. at 44.
15. 346 U.S. at 44-45.
16. The fallacies of this cavalier rejection of strict liability under the FTCA will be
considered in a separate section entitled "The Case for Strict Liability," infra.
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solute liability.17 Nevertheless, the question of whether such recovery
was possible remained alive because of the Fourth Circuit's decision
in United States v. Praylou,18 from which certiorari was denied soon
after the Dalehite decision, wherein the Government was held liable
on the basis of a South Carolina statute imposing absolute liability.
Constrained by his position on a court of appeals, Judge Parker,
author of the Praylou decision, was not free to reconsider or reject the
position taken by the Dalehite majority on strict or absolute liability.
Instead, he undertook to distinguish the cases, stating that liability aris-
ing from the possession of dangerous property is very different from
liability for damage inflicted by Government employees imposed upon
the basis of absolute liability rather than negligence.1 9 The attempted
distinction, which involves a shift of inquiry from the propriety of
defendant's conduct to the harmful invasion of interests suffered by
the plaintiff, is not a persuasive one, and its lack of persuasiveness
stimulated speculation that the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari
reflected uncertainty as to the validity of the Dalehite pronouncement
on the subject.
The speculation was intensified and further legitimatized three years
later by the Supreme Court's decision in Rayonier, Inc. v. United
States.20 As I pointed out soon after the decision in that case,21 the
17. Emelwon, Inc. v. United States, 391 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1968); Wright v. United
States, 404 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1968); United States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28 (10th Cir.
1965); Bartholmae Corp. v. United States, 253 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1957); United States
v. Taylor, 236 F.2d 649 (6th Cir. 1956), petition for cert. dismissed, 355 U.S. 801
(1957); Heale v. United States, 207 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1953). See Abraham v. United
States, 465 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1972). See also United States v. Hull, 195 F. 2d 64 (1st Cir.
1952), decided prior to Dalehite.
18. 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 315 (1954). In Praylou,
plaintiffs who suffered physical injury and property damage caused by a government
plane which crashed on their land were allowed to recover damages from the federal
government under the FTCA even though their recovery was predicated on a South
Carolina statute which imposed absolute liability upon owners of aircraft operated over
the state. The court stated that Congress did not intend to prohibit recovery based on
absolute liability under the FTCA, concluding that the effect of the state's strict liability
statute was to make the government's act "wrongful" within the meaning of the FTCA.
19. 208 F.2d at 295.
20. 352 U.S. 315 (1957). In Rayonier, the plaintiffs alleged federal negligence in
accumulating flammable materials on federal property and allowing the fires which
damaged plaintiffs' land to ignite and spread. The United States Supreme Court held
that plaintiffs were not precluded from recovering damages for negligence under the
FTCA by the government's allegations that the conduct involved occurred while govern-
ment employees were acting as public firemen, a uniquely governmental function for
which neither municipalities nor other local governments werb vicariously liable under
the common law or Washington state statutes. The Court remanded the case to the dis-
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had decided that governmental
liability could not be predicated on certain statutes of the State of
Washington which imposed liability without fault. The conflict be-
tween the decisions of the courts of appeals in Praylou and Rayonier
was mentioned several times in the briefs of both the petitioner and the
Government, with the Government's brief characterizing the Praylou
decision as "wrong" and in "irreconcilable conflict with Dalehite."22
With this background, it was significant to find Praylou cited in the
Rayonier decision with favor in support of a sentence stating:23
To the extent that there was anything to the contrary [i.e., anything
which would allow the government to limit its liability by character-
izing itself as a public body in order to invoke the law of municipal
corporations] in the Dalehite case it was necessarily rejected by In-
dian Towing.
The earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Indian Towing Com-
pany v. United States24 had not involved the question of strict or abso-
lute liability, but had made it apparent that new appointments and a
realignment of the Court had supplanted the majority of four in Dale-
hite.25 More important, its rejection of the argument that there was no
liability under the FTCA for acts performed in a "uniquely govern-
mental" capacity manifested a determination to adapt principles of
private tort law to liability assumed by the United States under the
Act. With this background it seemed significant that the Supreme
trict court to determine whether the law of Washington would hold a private person
liable for conduct similar to that alleged to constitute negligence under the FTCA. If
private persons would be liable for negligence under Washington law, the Rayonier
Court held that the federal government would be responsible under the FTCA even
though the alleged negligence was caused by federal employees acting as public firefight-
ers. See also Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960), in which the Court remanded
for consideration of whether a claim under the FTCA was covered by an Oregon em-
ployers' liability statute. The Court noted that the statute provided a road to recovery
"considerably easier" than the proof of negligence in a wrongful death action. Id. at 3 16.
21. Peck, Absolute Liability and the Federal Tort Clains Act, 9 STAN. L. REv. 433.
434 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Peck, Absolute Liability.]
22. Id.
23. 352 U.S. at 319 n.2.
24. 350 U.S. 61 (1955). Plaintiffs in Indian Towing were allowed recovery under
the FTCA for damages caused by the Coast Guard's negligent operation of a lighthouse
light. The Court held that the FTCA did not insulate the federal government from lia-
bility for functions alleged to be "uniquely governmental," concluding that the govern-
ment is responsible for negligence under the FTCA even if no private persons are en-
gaged in similar activities.
25. Peck, Absolute Liability, at 436 n.18.
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Court's remand in Rayonier to the district court for determination of
whether the allegations of the complaint would be sufficient to impose
liability on a private person was not limited to a liability for negli-
gence. The remand strongly suggested that the Government might be
liable even if the Washington statutes did impose liability without
fault.
III. LAIRD V. NELMS: THE COURT'S RATIONALE
Thus, in Laird v. Nelms the Supreme Court was free to approve the
Fourth Circuit's imposition of a strict or absolute liability for sonic
boom damage as consistent with its prior decisions under the FTCA.
Instead, Justice Rehnquist delivered an opinion one might expect
from a precedent-minded judge of a lower court who could not con-
sider the wisdom or continued vitality of language of an opinion of a
higher court. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist went further and overstated
the extent to which prior case law controlled the decision in Laird v.
Nelms. Speaking of the majority opinion in Dalehite, he said:26
The Court's opinion rejected various specifications of negligence on
the part of Government employees that had been found by the District
Court in that case, and then went on to treat petitioner's claim that the
Government was absolutely or strictly liable because of its having
engaged in a dangerous activity.
Of course, the majority in Dalehite had not rejected the district court's
findings of negligence. On the contrary, Justice Reed noted that the
findings of the district court had been explicitly rejected by only three
of the six judges of the court of appeals and stated that he would
consider the case as one in which the findings came to the Supreme
Court unimpaired.2 7 Justice Reed continued, "Even assuming their
correctness arguendo, though, it is our judgment that they do not es-
tablish a case within the Act."28
It is true that in one section of his opinion Justice Reed indicated
that experience prior to the Texas City explosion had indicated that
fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate was a material which could be
26. 406 U.S. at 798.




safely handled as it had been handled there,29 but immediately fol-
lowing that passage, in dealing with the challenged findings of negli-
gence of the Coast Guard in supervising the storage of the fertilizer and
fighting the fire after it started, he said, "We do not enter into an ex-
amination of these factual findings. We prefer, again, to rest our deci-
sion on the Act. ' 30 The Dalehite Court concluded that the Govern-
ment's failure to prevent the fire by regulating the storage of fertilizer
could not be the basis of liability because, like the specific findings of
negligence previously discussed, it was a matter classically within the
discretionary function exception. 3' According to Dalehite, govern-
mental liability for inadequately fighting the fire was further precluded
by the absence of a comparable private liability, since the Act did not
create new causes of action. 32
The effect of Justice Rehnquist's incorrect assertion that the Dalehite
majority had rejected the specifications of governmental negligence is
to create the impression that the right to recovery in Dalehite turned
upon the question of strict or absolute liability, implying that the Dal-
ehite majority's tangential comments on strict liability in that case
constituted what he called "the Court's holding in Dalehite."33
The Dalehite majority's discussion of the subject began, however,
with the above-quoted deprecatory phrase, "there is yet to be
disposed of some slight residue of theory of absolute liability without
fault, 34 which certainly does not signal that what follows is the cru-
cial portion of the opinion. Commentators have suggested that this
portion of the Dalehite majority opinion was dictum, 35 but whether it
was or not the Court's favorable citation of Praylou in the Rayonier
case at least gave it a challenged status nowhere reflected in Justice
Rehnquist's opinion.
Having concluded that the FTCA as interpreted in Dalehite pre-
cluded recovery on a theory of strict or absolute liability, Justice
29. 346 U.S. at 42.
30. 346 U.S. at 42-43.
31. 346 U.S. at 43.
32. Id. It was this latter proposition of Dalehite which was jettisoned in Indian Tow-
ing, supra note 24.
33. 406 U.S. at 799.
34. 346 U.S. at 44.
35. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 856 (1956); Jacoby, Absolute
Liability Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 24 FED. BAR J. 139, 140 (1964); Reynolds,
The Discretionary Function of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57 GEO. L.J. 81, 94 n.71
(1968); Steffen, A Federal Tort Claims Act Tort, 34 TENN. L. REv. 367, 374 (1967).
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Rehnquist turned his attention to the question of whether the act
which caused the sonic boom might be considered a trespass and thus
constitute a "wrongful act" for which liability might be imposed. That
the Government might be held liable for trespass under the Act was
established in 1956 in Hatahley v. United States.36 The legislative his-
tory to which reference was made in Laird v. Nelms also makes it
clear that Congress intended to make the Government liable under the
FTCA for trespass, and that it did so by adding the word "wrongful"
to the provision which ultimately became the grant of jurisdiction
under the Act.37 Although Justice Rehnquist stated that the type of
trespass subsumed under the word "wrongful" was exemplified by the
conduct of the Government agents in Hatahley,38 unfortunately
he did not explain what distinguishes the confiscation of horses
whose Indian owners are unknown from the infliction of a damaging
sonic boom on unknown persons below.39
Turning to the eminent domain cases to evaluate the prerequisites
of trespass under federal law, once again Justice Rehnquist dealt in an
argumentative manner with language of a former decision of the
Court to support his conclusion that there should be no liability. He
commented:40
The notion that a military plane on a high altitude training flight itself
intrudes upon any property interest of an owner of the land over
which it flies was rejected in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256
(1946).
36. 351 U.S. 173 (1956). In Hatahley, the federal government was held liable under
the FTCA for Department of Interior employees' confiscation and destruction of certain
Navajo Indians' horses found grazing on public lands. Although the federal employees'
action was authorized by a Utah abandoned horse statute, the government was found
liable because the federal agents had failed to give plaintiffs notice as required by a fed-
eral law, the Taylor Grazing Act, before impounding livestock unlawfully grazing on a
federal range. Consequently, their wrongful acts constituted trespasses.
37. See Peck, Absolute Liability, at 449.For the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970),
see note 8 and accompanying text supra.
38. 406 U.S. at 802.
39. One conceivable but unpersuasive difference is that the confiscation and de-
struction of each horse was a consequence specifically intended by the government
agents, whereas the government's lack of knowledge as to which houses or property
would be injured by the sonic boom arguably prevents characterizing the infliction of
harm as an intended consequence and hence as a trespass. This distinction, of course,
hinges on whether intent co.nprehends only the actor's specific purpose or also includes
the natural and probable consequences of his acts. The government here clearly in-
tended to create the sonic booms and knew that property d~mage probably would re-
suit, although it did not specifically intend to damage Mr. Nelms' house.
40. 406 U.S. at 799.
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He then quoted a portion of the Causby opinion declaring that the
ancient common law doctrine of ownership of land extending to the
periphery of the universe has no place in the modern world.41 From
this he concluded that a version of trespass to ground below by the
passage of a plane causing damage "was ruled out by established fed-
eral law."'42 That he attributed this effect to the Causby decision is
verified by his subsequent consideration of whether "the precise
holding of United States v. Causby"43 could be skirted by treating the
air wave of a sonic boom as a direct invasion of the land.
The precise holding of United States v. Causby was that the Gov-
ernment was liable to pay compensation because it had imposed a ser-
vitude constituting a taking of property by frequent, low flights of
Government aircraft which diminished the value of the land directly
below. 44 As the opinion explicitly noted that the general rejection of
the ancient rule did not control the case,45 the above-quoted language
cannot be construed to constitute Causby's holding. Further, the
Court in Causby did not attempt to determine the precise limits of the
air space in the public domain. 46 Contrary to Justice Rehnquist's
statement, it did not decide whether injurious uses of the air space in
the public domain constituted a wrong to the owner of the land below.47
If anything, the holding of the case is more consistent with govern-
mental tort liability predicated on infrequent aircraft flights which
damage the property below than it is with the conclusion drawn by
Justice Rehnquist. 48 Nevertheless, based on his analysis of Causby,
41. The portion of the opinion which he quoted, 406 U.S. at 799-800, reads as fol-
lows:
It is ancient doctrine that at common law ownership of the land extended to the
periphery of the universe--cujus est solumn ejus est usque ad coelum. But that doc-
trine has no place in the modern world. The air is a public highway, as Congress has
declared. Were that not true, every transcontinental flight would subject the oper-
ator to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize such
private claims to the air space would clog these highways, seriously interfere with
their control and development in the public interest, and transfer into private own-
ership that to which only the public has a just claim. 328 U.S. at 260-261.
42. 406 U.S. at 800.
43. Id.
44. 328 U.S. 256, 261-62. Thus a physical touching of the land was not regarded as a
prerequisite of a constitutional taking of property.
45. 328 U.S. at 261. See note 41 supra.
46. 328 U.S. at 266.
47. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962), however, did allow recovery
for use of public, navigable airspace which damaged the owner below. See note 54 infra.
48. In actions based on a constitutional taking rather than a governmental tort
theory, several state court decisions have fully adopted the rationale foreshadowed by
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Justice Rehnquist concluded that a sonic boom cannot constitute an
invasion of private property sufficient to justify recovery based on a
trespass theory.
Justice Rehnquist's comments on Causby merit further criticism.
First, the wording of the FTCA strongly indicates that state law con-
trols what constitutes a wrongful act under the statute.49 Moreover,
state law and not federal law has been used to give meaning to other
crucial words in the FTCA. Thus, it is state law which determines the
very important question of whether an employee was acting within the
course of his employment so as to fasten liability upon the United
States.5 0 The statutory phrase accepting liability "in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred" has been in-
terpreted to incorporate the whole law, including the conflict of law
rules, of that place to ensure that the United States is treated as a pri-
vate individual under like circumstances. 51 In so holding, the Supreme
Court cautioned that in interpreting the FTCA it should not52
be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but [should]
look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.
We should not assume that Congress intended to set the courts com-
pletely adrift from state law with regard to questions for which it has
not provided a specific and definite answer in an act such as the one
before us which, as we have-indicated, is so intimately related to state
law.
And on questions of substantive law controlling liability, state law, not
federal law, governs on such matters as negligence per se, proximate
cause, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, burden of proof,
res ipsa loquitur, damages, contribution and indemnity, and the effect
of a release from liability.53
Further, accepting arguendo the Court's undivided interest in fed-
Causby, holding that governmental interference with private property can constitute
constitutional taking in the absence of trespass (overflight) by the government. See, e.g.,
Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wn. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964); Thornburg v. Port of
Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962); Stoebuck, Condemnation by Nuisance:
The Airport Cases in Retrospect and Prospect, 71 DICK. L. REv. 207 (1967). Cf. Batten
v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962).
49. See note 10 and accompanying text, supra.
50. Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857 (1955).
51. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
52. 369 U.S. at I1.
53. Note, Extent to which State Law is Applicable in Actions under Federal Tort
Claims Act-Federal Cases, 7 L. ED. 994.
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eral common law, the Court cited the wrong case; it totally ignored
Griggs v. Allegheny County,54 which at least arguably established the
right to recover damages for a governmental taking even where tech-
nical trespass to the landowner's airspace cannot be proved. It is also
significant that Causby involved a governmental taking of private
property under the fifth amendment; Causby's discussion of trespass
did not apply to a claim under the FTCA. In addition, the Court mis-
represented the Causby decision by failing to consider its ubiquitous
concern with interference with the utility of the land as an underlying
basis for recovery.55
Finally, the majority opinion in Laird v. Nelms noted that fol-
lowing the Court's decision in Dalehite Congress enacted a bill
granting compensation to some of the victims of the Texas City disas-
ter, and that at no time during the hearings was an attempt made to
modify the Court's construction of the FTCA.56 The relevance of the
suggested inference of congressional approval depends, of course,
upon the reading given the Dalehite decision. If, as suggested above,
the decision is interpreted as resting upon the Court's construction of
the discretionary function exception of the Act, the failure of Congress
to act would constitute but a weak indication of congressional
opinion concerning the question of strict or absolute liability. More-
over, the sound view that legislative failure to enact a bill is not one of
54. 369 U.S. 84 (1962). In Griggs, the defendant county, which owned and operated
a public airport in compliance with CAA regulations, was held liable for the taking of
an air easement based on damage caused by aircraft flights which passed over plaintiffs'
property on takeoff and landing. These flights were in the public or navigable airspace
as defined by statute [49 U.S.C. § 1301(24) (1964)], because navigable airspace had
been legislatively redefined to include takeoff and landing patterns. While stressing that
the flights were directly over plaintiffs' land, technical trespass to the landowners' air-
space did not and could not exist since the flights originated in public, navigable air-
space. Griggs thus implied that overflight (trespass) was not a prerequisite of recovery.
55. Although flights directly over plaintiffs lands were involved in Catusby, the
Court repeatedly designated nonphysical elements such as use and enjoyment of the sur-
face as essential property rights. Stating that compensation should be made for destruc-
tion of the "owner's right to possess and exploit the land... his beneficial ownership,"
the Court concluded that the compensation should follow even if the "enjoyment and use
of the land are not completely destroyed." 328 U.S. at 262. The Court further com-
mented:
the use of the airspace immediately above the land would limit the utility of the
land and cause a diminution in its value .... Flights over private land are not a
taking, unless they are so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate in-
terference with the enjoyment and use of the land.
328 U.S. at 266 (emphasis added).
56. 406 U.S. at 802.
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the designated ways of enacting a law cautions against attributing sig-
nificance to uninitiated or uncompleted legislative activities. 57
IV. PROBLEMS CREATED BY LAIRD V. NELMS
The decision in Laird v. Nelms will almost certainly lead to a nar-
rowing of governmental liability under the FTCA. The majority's
suggestion that the Act accepts only liabilities based upon the prin-
ciple of respondeat superior58 will enable the federal government to
avoid many tort liabilities not based on that principle. Thus it may be
expected that the Government will resist with increased vigor any at-
tempt to impose liabilities such as those previously recognized on the
basis of the Oregon Employer's Liability Law,59 the Illinois Scaf-
folding Act, 60 or the Wisconsin Safe Place Statute6 ' in situations in
which no Government employee would have been liable for a tort.
The Government will enjoy even greater success in resisting attempts
to impose liability under principles of state law imposing non-
delegable duties upon the employers of independent contractors. 62
It will undoubtedly continue to insist, as it has successfully done in
the past, that liability cannot be imposed under permissive use statutes
or comparable rules of state law simply because of ownership of prop-
erty such as automobiles or aircraft. 63 Dram shop statutes will no
57. See Hart, Comment on Courts and Law Making, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY
AND ToMORROw 40, 46 (1959). See, e.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 47
(1950).
58. 406U.S.at801.
59. Hess v. United States, 282 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1960), noted in 36 WASH. L. REv.
229 (1961).
60. Schmid v. United States, 273 F.2d 172 (7thCir. 1959).
61. American Exchange Bank of Madison v. United States, 257 F.2d 938 (7th Cir.
1958).
62. Such a liability has been denied in a number of cases. See, e.g., Hodge v. United
States, 310 F. Supp. 1090 (M.D. Ga. 1969), affd, 424 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1970); Wright v.
United States, 404 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1968); Emelwon, Inc. v. United States, 391 F.2d 9
(5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 979 (1966). Some courts have found the Government liable on the theory that it
was guilty of negligence in failing to perform its non-delegable duty; see, e.g., Emel-
won, Inc. v. United States, supra; Pierce v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Tenn.
1955), affd, 235 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1956). See L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS § 214.02(5) (1970) for a discussion of the cases.
63. See Hubsch v. United States, 174 F.2d 7 (5th Cir.,1949), referred to dist. ct.for
approval of compromise, 338 U.S. 440 (1949); United States v. Taylor, 236 F.2d 649
(6th Cir. 1956), petition for cert. dismissed, 355 U.S. 801 (1957).
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longer provide a basis for recovery for harm done by persons who
have become intoxicated at military clubs. 64
Further, the Laird Court's treatment of whether the air wave of a
sonic boom can be regarded as an invasion of land indicates that the
Government will not be liable in blasting cases under the FTCA on
the theory of absolute liability. It raises problems of governmental lia-
bility even in states in which trespass has been the theory for imposing
liability for damage done by flying debris in blasting cases. 65 Said Jus-
tice Rehnquist:66
It is quite clear, however, that the presently prevailing view as to
the theory of liability for blasting damage is frankly conceded to be
strict liability for undertaking an ultrahazardous activity, rather than
any attenuated notion of common-law trespass. See Restatement of
Torts, §§ 519, 520(e); W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 75 (4th ed. 1971).
While a leading North Carolina case on the subject of strict liability
discusses the distinction between actions on the case and actions sound-
ing in trespass that the earlier decisions made, it, too, actually grounds
liability on the basis that he who engages in ultrahazardous activity
must pay his way regardless of what precautions he may have taken.
Guilford Realty and Ins. Co. v. Blythe Bros. Co., 260 N.C. 69, 131
S.E.2d 900 (1963).
More importantly, however, Congress in considering the Federal
Tort Claims Act cannot realistically be said to have dealt in terms of
either the jurisprudential distinctions peculiar to the forms of action at
common law or the metaphysical subtleties that crop up in even con-
temporary discussions of tort theory. See Prosser, supra, at 492-496.
The legislative history discussed in Dalehite indicates that Congress
intended to permit liability essentially based on the intentionally
wrongful or careless conduct of Government employees, for which the
Government was to be made liable according to state law under the
doctrine of respondeat superior, but to exclude liability based solely
on the ultrahazardous nature of an activity undertaken by the Govern-
ment.
64. Deeds v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 348 (D. Mont. 1969); but cf. Konsler v.
United States, 288 F. Supp. 895 (N.D. Il1. 1968); Megge v. United States, 344 F.2d 31
(6th Cir. 1965).
65. Prosser, The Principle of Rylands v. Fletcher, in SELECTED ToPIcs IN THE LAW
OF TORTS 159, 161 (1953), states that there are seven or eight jurisdictions which distin-
guish between trespass and case in blasting cases.
66. 406 U.S. at 800-01.
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Conceivably diligent counsel may be able to persuade courts that the
theory of liability in a particular state still remains that of trespass and
thus obtain a recovery denied in other jurisdictions in which the courts
have recognized that blasting cases present appropriate situations for
the use of a strict liability test. But the strong implication of the
Court's language is that in the future the United States will be held
liable in blasting cases only upon proof of negligence.
Laird v. Nelms illustrates another problem met with sufficient fre-
quency to justify changes in the jurisdiction of the federal district
courts. In the district court Nelms had claimed a right to compensa-
tion on the alternative ground that his property had been taken
without just compensation. Section 1346(a)(2) of the Judicial Code
grants jurisdiction to federal district courts to hear claims against the
United States:67
founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any
regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied
contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated dam-
ages in cases not sounding in tort.
However, since the jurisdiction granted is for claims not exceeding
$10,000,68 the provision has a limited attraction for persons like
Nelms, who had claimed damages of $16,000 in his FTCA suit. If the
conduct complained of is a compensable taking rather than a tort, the
federal district court has no jurisdiction if the claim exceeds $10,000,
and the availability of relief will depend upon whether the suit is
transferred to the court of claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(c).69
On the other hand, the court of claims does not have original juris-
diction of suits under the FTCA, so filing suit there would preclude
consideration of the tort claim.
The difficulties of determing whether a claim is properly viewed as
a tort claim, a contract claim, or a claim for a compensable taking
would be reduced greatly if the $10,000 limitation on the jurisdiction
of the federal district courts under the Tucker Act were removed or at
least raised substantially.70 The time certainly has passed when a liti-
67. 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2) (1970).
68. Id.
69. See Myers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1963); cf. Vigel v. United
States, 293 F. Supp. 1176 (D. Colo. 1958).
70. Jurisdiction of claims not exceeding that amount was conferred on the district
courts in 1911, and the decline in the value of the dollar since then would itself justify a
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gant should be forced to decide, on the basis of a pretrial appraisal of
his theories of recovery, in which of two courts with different and
varying jurisdictions he will file his action. 71
In addition, the majority's suggested limitation of liability to "inten-
tionally wrongful or careless conduct"72 reduces the remedies avail-
able to those who have been injured by tortious Government activ-
ities. There are many torts for which liability cannot be characterized
as involving "intentionally wrongful or careless conduct." For exam-
ple, there is a well-established strict liability for subsidence of land
caused by removal of lateral or subjacent support, for damage done
by trespassing cattle, for conversion of property purchased bona fides,
for misdelivery of a bailed chattel, for sale of a defective product in
the course of business, and for renting defective equipment. 73 Almost
equally absolute is the liability imposed upon common carriers for
damage to goods transported or the liability imposed upon hotel or
innkeepers for loss of a guest's goods.74 Even intentional and harmful
invasions of land, for which a private person would be liable, may not
be wrongful because justification may arise from an emergency. Thus,
the Air Force pilot who intentionally selects a field of wheat in which
to set down his falling aircraft may have a privilege to do so arising
from his private emergency.75 Even when he selects a less populated
portion of a city in which to crash land, his conduct might be con-
sidered justifiable in light of both public and private emergencies.
Predictably, each of these traditional tort liabilities will in time be
subjected to judicial scrutiny to determine whether it is suffi-
ciently "wrongful" to provide a basis for recovery under the FTCA.
Thus it will be necessary to deal with the "jurisprudential distinctions"
doubling of the limit. Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 20, 36 Stat. 1093. Circuit
courts were given jurisdiction of claims up to $10,000 in the original Tucker Act. Act of
March 3, 1887, ch. 359, § 2, 24 Stat. 505. Moreover, an increase in the jurisdiction of the
district courts would be consistent with the Congressional decision in 1962 to facilitate
litigation with the government by permitting suits against government officers in courts
more conveniently located for the plaintiffs. Act of Oct. 5, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-748, 76
Stat. 744.
7 1. For a comparable view, see Steffen, A Federal Tort Claims Act Tort, 34 TENN.
L. REV. 367, 395-408 (1967).
72. 406U.S.at801.
73. See Peck, Negligence and Liability Without Fault in Tort Law, 46 WASH. L.
REv. 225, 232-239 (1971). See also U.S. DEP'T TRANSP., THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION: AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION STUDY (1970).
74. Peck, supra note 73, at 234.
75. Cf. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910);
Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908).
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and "metaphysical subtleties" of the law of torts which Justice
Rehnquist thought deserved no consideration. Limitation of liability
to conduct which is wrongful in a moral or ethical sense will, of
course, depart further from the FTCA's general objective of making
Government as responsible for harms tortiously inflicted as are private
persons. It also will expose Congress to the burden of considering pri-
vate bills for the benefit of those denied relief under the FTCA.
V. THE CASE FOR RECOGNIZING STRICT LIABILITY
The failure of the Court in Laird v. Nelms to repudiate the lan-
guage of Dalehite relating to strict or absolute liability is to be la-
mented when one considers the strength of the case for recognizing
such liability. That argument was forcefully presented in Justice Stew-
art's dissent. It also has been fully developed elsewhere,76 and will
only be summarized here.
The argument first must overcome the contention that such liability
is precluded by the language of the jurisdictional grant of 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b), which permits suits for injuries "caused by the negligent
or wrongful act or omission" of a Government employee. Since strict
or absolute liability is imposed without regard to negligence or fault, it
is a liability based on conduct which is not wrongful in the sense of
being prohibited or condemned. But the proposition that recovery is
therefore precluded under the FTCA rests upon an assumption that
when Congress used the word "wrongful" in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) it
used it in a sense involving some moral or ethical judgment. That is
possible, but Congress also might have used the word in a legalistic
sense, in which case the word is synonymous with the word "tortious."' 77
It certainly seems likely that in legislating on the subject of tort suits
against the Government, Congress would use words in their legal
rather than their colloquial meaning. If the word "tortious" were sub-
76. See Jacoby, Absolute Liability Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 24 FED. BAR.
J. 433 (1964); Steffen, A Federal Tort Claims Act Tort, 34 TENN. L. REv. 367,
370-382, 410 (1967); Peck, Absolute Liability; 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS 860 (1956); Note, Absolute Liability and the Tort Claims Act, 5 STAN. L. REV. 274
(1953).
77. BLACK'S LAW DIcMONARY 1739 (3rd Ed. 1933) defines the word "Tortious" as
"Wrongful; of the nature of a tort," and at 1738, the word 'Tort" is defined as "Wrong;
injury; the opposite of right." It is there further said, "In modern practice, tort is con-
stantly used as an English word to denote a wrong or wrongful act, for which an action
will lie, as distinguished from a contract."
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stituted for the word "wrongful" there could be no doubt that the ju-
risdictional grant encompasses liability for harm which is not intended
and which could not be prevented by reasonable precautions or care.78
Even if the word "wrongful" embodied a more common sense mean-
ing, a strong case has been made that one who has injured another by
engaging in an extrahazardous activity is guilty of a conditional fault
which is removed only through payment of compensation.79
The argument that the statute should be construed to permit re-
covery against the Government on any principle of state private tort
law (other than those expressly excluded) finds strength in the name of
the Act itself. It also finds support in the previously quoted provision
of 28 U.S.C. § 2674, rendering the United States liable "in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like cir-
cumstances." The fact that that section contains two general excep-
tions (for interests prior to judgment and punitive damages) invokes
the familiar rule of statutory construction that courts should give ef-
fect only to express exceptions. The inference that Congress did not
intend to preclude imposition of strict or absolute liability is further
strengthened by the specific exceptions found in 28 U.S.C. § 2680.80 In
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6, comment a (1965).
79. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401 (1959).
Keeton defines "conditional fault" as the moral sense of the community, roughly equiva-
lent to a shared concept of blameworthiness. The author considers this moral standard to
be the real basis for emerging principles of tort law. Id. at 418-19.
80. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1970) reads as follows:
Exceptions.
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346 (b) of this title shall not apply
to-
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a fed-
eral agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion in-
volved be abused.
(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of
letters or postal matter.
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or cus-
toms duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs
or excise or any other law-enforcement officer.
(d) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by sections 741-752, 781-790 of
Title 46, relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the United States.
(e) Any claim arising out of an act or omission of any employee of the Govern-
ment in administering the provisions of sections 1-31 of Title 50, Appendix.
(f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establishment of a quar-
antine by the United States.
(g) Repealed. Sept. 26, 1950, ch. 1049, § 13(5), 64 Stat. 1043.
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
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particular, the inference is supported by the specific exceptions of 28
U.S.C. § 2680(h) for "any claim arising out of assault, battery, false
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process,
libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract
rights." If there had been a congressional intent to exclude the
well-known strict liability of those engaging in ultrahazardous activ-
ities, the legislators' pervasive desire for comprehensive and unambig-
uous draftsmanship certainly would have dictated inclusion of that
type of tort liability in the list of exceptions.81
The argument for recognizing strict or absolute liability under the
FTCA also needs to overcome the contention that liability under the
Act is limited to that encompassed by the principle of respondeat su-
perior because 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) accepts liability only for harm
caused by acts or omissions "of any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his office or employment .... " Since
there was no doubt that the harm was caused by the governmentally
authorized act of the Air Force pilot in Laird, the majority opinion
did not rely on the FTCA's scope of employment limitation as a
reason for denying liability. But that argument has succeeded in other
contexts in which attempts have been made to impose liability on the
basis of government ownership of property or state laws establishing
vicarious liability for performance of non-delegable duties. The gov-
ernment thus has escaped liability by alleging that the harm com-
plained of was caused either by an independent contractor or by a
condition of government property not created by a federal employee,
harms conventionally outside the scope of respondeat superior lia-
bility and hence beyond the FTCA's allegedly narrow waiver of sover-
malicious prosectution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit,
or interference with contract rights.
(i) Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or by
the regulation of the monetary system.
(j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval
forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.
(k) Any claim arising in a foreign country.
(1) Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
(m) Any claim arising from the activities of the Panama Canal Company.(n) Any claim arising from the activities of a Federal land bank, a Federal inter-
mediate credit bank, or a bank for cooperatives....
81. Of course if the drafters subjectively intended the term "wrongful" to exclude
strict liability, they would not have listed it as an exception. But this contention contra-
dicts the rule of statutory construction which recognizes legislators' natural desire for




eign immunity.82 The statutory argument is technical, converting a
recognition that government acts only through its employees into a
principle limiting liability. Thus, even in acquiring property or ar-
ranging for the performance of nondelegable duties, the United States
must act through its employees.
Respondeat superior evolved with the changing needs of society as
but one of the rules imposing vicarious liability, a rule which has
nothing to commend itself as particularly suitable to problems of gov-
ernmental liability. Given a general commitment to principles of state
tort law, there is no reason to exclude from the act any liability for
tortious conduct recognized by state law.83
Another obstacle to recognizing strict or absolute liability under the
FTCA lies in the discretionary function exception of 28 U.S.C. §
2680.84 That exception has been the source of considerable difficulty
in administration of the Act and has received critical attention from
the commentators. 85 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had
found the exception inapplicable in its decision in Laird v. Nelms
because it concluded that the discretion of the officer who authorized
the training flight was limited by an Air Force regulation directing
that precautions be taken in "planning the maximum protection for
civilian communities."8 6 Other courts have reached a contrary conclu-
sion, holding that the discretionary function exception bars recovery
for harm caused by sonic booms produced in the course of authorized
flights.87 Because of his conclusion that the FTCA did not permit the
imposition of strict or absolute liability upon which the right to re-
covery depended, Justice Rehnquist found it unnecessary to examine
this exception. Justice Stewart, however, considered the matter and
concluded that the exception was inapplicable.
82. See Peck, Absolute Liability, at 446-47.
83. Id. at 447-48.
84. See note 80 supra.
85. James, The Federal Tort Claims Act and the- Discretionary Function Excep-
tion: The Sluggish Retreat of an Ancient Immunity, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 184 (1957);
Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Proposed Construction of the Discretionary
Function Exception, 31 WASH. L. REV. 207 (1956); Reynolds, The Discretionary
Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57 GEo. L.J. 81 (1968); K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25.08 (Supp. 1970); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES. THE
LAW OF TORTS 296-97 (Supp. 1968).
86. 442 F.2d 1163, 1165-66.
87. See Abraham v. United States, 465 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1972); Maynard v. United
States, 430 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1970); McMurray v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 701
(W.D. Mo. 1968); Schwartz v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 164 (D.N.D. 1965); Huslander
v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 1004 (W.D.N.Y. 1964).
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Justice Stewart's review of the legislative history of the FTCA led
him to conclude, as have the commentators, 88 that the primary pur-
pose of the discretionary function exception was to avoid subjecting
policy decisions of Congress, the executive branch, or administrative
agencies to second-guessing by courts under the guise of tort actions.
As long as the state statutes and judicial decisions establishing strict
liability are general principles of state law, imposing absolute liability
under the FTCA creates no possibility of second-guessing because
such liability does not depend upon a judicial determination that the
Government officials acted negligently, irresponsibly, illegally, un-
wisely, or in any other improper manner. 89 As illustrated by Laird, the
only issues before the court would be causation and damages. Since
the purpose of the discretionary function exception would not be
served in such a case, it should not be applied.9 0
As Justice Stewart argued, the rule announced by the majority
seems to be contrary to the whole policy of the FTCA.9 1 That Act was
adopted to ensure that the inevitable costs of government would be
shared by the public which enjoys the benefits of the government's ac-
tivities. To permit the infliction of harm such as that caused by the
sonic boom of a military aircraft to go uncompensated constitutes an
almost barbarous method of allocating the inevitable costs of military
operations. One would be horrified at the suggestion that an employee
of the Internal Revenue Service might raise funds to support a mili-
tary training program by selecting at random both the individual tax-
payer and the amount to be contributed. Yet that is very nearly the
result reached by the majority in denying Nelms any recovery for the
harm inflicted upon his house because of his inability to prove negli-
gence in the operation of the aircraft involved.9 2 Such a cavalier rejec-
88. See note 85 supra.
89. However, courts would have to remain alert for the possibility of state absolute
liability law which would be general in form but specific in reality. For example, a state
law imposing strict liability on all who engage in a specific activity which in reality is
conducted by the federal government should be subject to special scrutiny to avoid al-
lowing state courts or legislatures to arbitrate federal policy decisions.
90. Cf. Peck, Absolute Liability, at 450-53.
91. 406 U.S. at 809.
92. We do, of course, use a lottery for determining which of our young men will be
called to military service, which usually results in a loss of income or delay of career
development, and may even result in serious injury or death. The traditional obligation
of all men to serve in the military service has provided a rationalization which converts
the selection process into something less than the imposition of a new burden. However,
recognition that Government should pay a fair wage for the services it receives from
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tion of liability93 may be expected to result in a number of private
congressional bills requesting compensation for persons similarly in-
jured, and thus to defeat a principal objective of the FTCA-the relief
of Congress from the burden of considering private bills. 94 Further,
since risk-bearing capacity and the ability to spread costs constitute a
major part of the rationale for strict or absolute liability, such a rule is
especially appropriate for abnormally dangerous activities of the
United States Government. Nevertheless, the Government apparently
will go free absent proof of negligence when it conducts abnormally
dangerous activities, while others less able to bear the burden remain
strictly liable. Thus if commercial airlines ever engage in supersonic
flights over the United States the predictable result is that they will be
held to a strict liability which the Government has been allowed to
escape. 95
members of the military has affected even this traditional concept of a citizen's duty and
obligation so that fully professional and volunteer armed forces, not dependent on the
draft, soon may be established.
93. As amended in 1970, the Military Claims Act permits the Secretary of the
Army, Navy or Air Force to settle claims for personal injury or property damage in
amounts not more than $15,000. However, the policy of the Air Force appears to re-
sist payment of sums for structural damage to buildings on the theory that such damage
is not caused by sonic booms. See United States v. Gravelle, 407 F.2d 964, at 966-968
(10th Cir. 1969); Note, 32 J. AIR L. & COM. 596, 598 (1966). Even when compensation
is paid under the Act, the decision to do so is made administratively as a matter of grace
rather than as a matter of right of the injured party.
94. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1952). In support of the legis-
lation that became the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Report of the House of Representa-
tives stated:
For many years the present system has been subjected to criticism, both as being
unduly burdensome to the Congress and as being unjust to the claimants, in that it
does not accord to injured parties a recovery as a matter of right but bases any
award that may be made on considerations of grace. Moreover, it does not afford a
well-defined continually operating machinery for the consideration of such claims.
The magnitude of the task of considering and disposing of private claims can be
gathered from the following statistics:
In the Sixty-eighth Congress about 2,200 private claim bills were introduced, of
which 250 became law, then the largest number in the history of the Claims Com-
mittee.
In the Seventieth Congress 2,268 private claim bills were introduced, asking
more than $100,000,000. Of these, 336 were enacted, appropriating about
$2,830,000, of which 144, in the amount of $562,000, were for tort.
In each of the Seventy-fourth and Seventy-fifth Congresses over 2,300 private
claim bills were introduced, seeking more than $ 100,000,000. In the Seventy-sixth
Congress approximately 2,000 bills were introduced, of which 315 were approved
for a total of $826,000.
In the Seventy-seventh Congress, of the 1,829 private claims bills introduced and
referred to the Claims Committee, 593 were approved for a total of $1,000,253.30.
• * . So far during the present Congress about 1,279 private claim bills have been
introduced. Of these, 225 have been enacted, appropriating about $965,353.06.
H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1945).
95. Baxter, The SST: From Watts to Harlem in Two Hours, 21 STAN. L. REV. I
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VI. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
A complete review of the experience under the FTCA and formula-
tion of a definitive proposal for its revision is a project beyond the
scope of this law review article. Such a project should be undertaken
by the staffs of appropriate congressional committees; it should in-
clude not only review of court decisions and problems encountered in
the administrative settlement of claims, but also consideration of the
possibility of recognizing claims which so clearly are not covered by
the present Act that they have not become the subject of suits or ad-
ministrative consideration. An account should be obtained from each
government agency of its experience with the Act and its recommen-
dations for change or expansion of coverage. Views of practitioners,
judges, and other experts should of course be obtained. The 568-page
report of the California Law Revision Commission on the problems of
sovereign immunity in that state suggests the magnitude of the task.9 6
Nevertheless, Laird v. Nelms makes it imperative to suggest revisions
to the jurisdictional grant and discretionary function provisions of the
FTCA.
VII. CLARIFYING THE JURISDICTIONAL GRANT
The problems created by Laird v. Nelms could be avoided by
changing the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)97 to incorporate ex-
pressly in that jurisdictional grant the test of the liability of a private
individual under like circumstances now stated in 28 U.S.C. § 2674.98
Thus, the language could be changed to confer upon the district
(1968), is an excellent article describing in detail the nature of sonic booms and the
dangerous and unpredictable possibilities of magnification or reinforcement of the pres-
sure waves through atmospheric conditions and topography. The author concludes that
the only basis of liability that seems a fruitful avenue to recovery for sonic boom
damage is strict liability, and he adopts that test for federal legislation which he pro-
poses. Id. at 50, 56. Others who have given consideration to the subject have likewise
concluded that there should be a strict liability for harm caused by sonic booms. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520A (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966); W. PROSSER,
LAw OF TORTS 516 (4th ed. 1971); Note, 20 KANSAS L. REV. 545 (1972); Note, 47
N.Y.U.L. REV. 136 (1972); Note, 32 J. AIR L. & CoM. 596, 606 (1966); Comment, 31
S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 284 (1958).
96. See CALIF. LAW REVISION COMM'N, A STUDY RELATING TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
(1963).
97. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
98. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
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courts jurisdiction of civil actions against the United States for dam-
ages for:
injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
tortious conduct, acts or omissions of any federal agency of the United
States, including the tortious conduct, acts or omissions of any em-
ployee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of
the place where the conduct, act or omission occurred.
This acceptance of a general liability for tortious conduct does re-
quire adaptation of the private law of torts to peculiar problems of
governmental responsibility. Governmental activity differs in some
crucial respects from private activity, and some exceptions from rules
of private liability must be expected. The alternative is to enact a
statute designating the specific types of liability recognized, but this
approach would require an unworkable cataloging of types of com-
pensable harm unless some principles of general applicability were
stated. If general principles are stated, the result is not significantly
different from a generalized acceptance of private tort law.
The experience of several states which have extensively relin-
quished sovereign immunity corroborates the workability of the pro-
posed rule. A broad waiver of immunity has been the rule in New
York for many years. 99 While the judiciary has found it necessary to
engraft exceptions from the principles of private tort law, the New
York experience has proved that those principles have a general
adaptability to operations of government.100 The State of Washington
has had a similar broad waiver of immunity since 1961,101 and
nothing which has occurred since its enactment indicates that princi-
ples of private tort law are unsuitable when applied to determine gov-
ernmental liability. Although the statute adopted by the California
legislature in 1963 begins with a general disclaimer of tort liability,
subsequent sections comprehensively adopt principles of private tort
law.102 Thus its end product reflects the judgment of the California
99. See N.Y. CT. CL. ACT. § 8 (McKinney 1963).
100. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 292 (Supp. 1968). See also
Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Proposed Construction of the Discretionary
Function Exception, 31 WASH. L. REV. 207, 209-10 n.9, n.10 (1956).
101. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.090 (Supp. 1971).
102. See CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 815-840.6 (West 1966). The broad disclaimer of
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legislature that general tort principles are adaptable to problems of
governmental liability.
One exception from a comprehensive acceptance of private tort
principles does seem essential to accommodate the problems of gov-
ernment. It is what is usually referred to as a discretionary function
exception.
VIII. THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
The discretionary function exception of the FTCA has been the
source of considerable litigation and the subject of a considerable
amount of critical commentary.1 03 Twenty-six years of experience
with the Act should make it possible now for Congress to state with
greater clarity the solutions to what were only suspected to be prob-
lems of applying tort law to operations of government. In addition,
the experience in several states with state tort claims acts provides
guidance in revising the language.
The FTCA exception now provides that the Act shall not apply
to:104
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regu-
lation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform
a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved
be abused.
The first portion of the exception-that relating to acts of em-
ployees exercising due care in the execution of a statute or regulation
-has not been a source of difficulty, and it probably should be re-
tained in its present form. The FTCA was not intended to serve as a
liability is found in § 815(a). However, subsequent sections provide, for example, that a
public entity is liable to the same extent as a private person for injuries proximately
caused by public employees acting within the scope of their employment (§ 815.2), and
for injuries proximately caused by the tortious acts of independent contractors (§
815.4). Other provisions enact familiar tort law formulations weighing foreseeability of
risk, gravity of potential harm, reasonableness of conduct creating the dangerous condi-
tions, and practicability of alternative courses of action as determinants of a public enti-
ty's liability (§§ 835, 835.2, 835.4).
103. See note 85 supra.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970).
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means for testing the wisdom or validity of statutes or regulations in a
tort action. Nor should the failure of a legislature to adopt a better or
wiser policy constitute a tort. Perhaps legislation should be enacted to
provide remedies for persons who have suffered special losses or harm
through enforcement of laws later found to be invalid, such as impris-
onment under a statute later declared unconstitutional, or the finan-
cial losses of defense against prosecution under such a statute. But if
the government employees involved have exercised "due care" in the
execution of a statute or regulation, the case is not one for a tort re-
covery. The problem is one peculiar to government, finding no ana-
logue in private activity, and it should not be treated under general
tort law even if some principle of tort law might be thought applicable
to such a claim.
It is the latter portion of the exception-the discretionary function
portion-which should be revised. It should be deleted from 28
U.S.C. § 2680(a) and replaced by a new section reading:
The United States shall not be liable in any action based upon conse-
quences which were intended, or which were the result of alleged neg-
ligent acts or failures to act, if the United States proves that those spe-
cific consequences were intentionally caused, or in a negligence action
that the risks of those consequences were knowingly, deliberately, or
necessarily encountered, by an employee or officer who was author-
ized to do so and who did so pursuant to discretionary authority given
him by the Constitution, a statute, or a regulation.
This is a rephrasing of the defense which I earlier suggested that the
Government be required to establish in order to invoke the present
discretionary function exception. 105 The effect of the rephrased excep-
tion would be to allow the government to establish a discretionary
function defense to tort claims based on intentional or negligent mis-
conduct but not to claims based on strict liability. The defense would
be affirmative, requiring the government to prove the officer's or em-
ployee's authority to make the decision which caused the harm or
created the risk of harm. Requiring proof of such authority pre-
cludes the application of the defense to conduct of employees who
have no authority to establish norms but who are expected to be
guided by existing norms. It also precludes the application of the de-
105. Peck, supra note 73, at 225.
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fense to conduct of employees or officers who may have had but in
fact did not utilize discretionary authority. I make this suggestion with
the confidence derived from the approval the test has found in the
decisions of the Supreme Courts of California and Washington
dealing with discretionary function problems under tort claims acts of
those states.
In Johnson v. State'0 6 the Supreme Court of California encoun-
tered the contention that a parole officer's decision not to warn foster
parents of the homicidal tendencies of a sixteen-year-old boy was the
exercise of a discretionary function within the meaning of the Califor-
nia code provisions applicable to tort claims. The court- rejected the
contention while adopting a construction of those code provisions
which would ensure judicial abstention in areas in which responsibil-
ity for the basic policy decisions has been committed to other
branches of government. Consistent with the suggestion that the de-
fense be an affirmative defense, the court said: 107
Immunity for "discretionary" activities serves no purpose except to
assure that courts refuse to pass judgment on policy decisions in the
province of coordinate branches of government. Accordingly, to be
entitled to immunity the state must make a showing that such a policy
decision, consciously balancing risks and advantages, took place. The
fact that an employee normally engages in "discretionary activity" is
irrelevant if, in a given case, the employee did not render a considered
decision.
The Washington Supreme Court faced the question of whether a dis-
cretionary function exception should be engrafted judicially upon the
broad statutory acceptance of tort liability in a case involving the
claims for damage done by a juvenile who had escaped from a close
security correction facility and set fire to a church and a house.' 08 The
plaintiff charged the state with negligence in maintaining an "open
program" at the institution, in assigning the boy to that program, and
in assigning the boy to work on the boiler room detail. 09 The court
decided that the claim was barred by an implied discretionary func-
106. 69 Cal. 2d 782,73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 447 P.2d 352 (1968).
107. 73 Cal. Rptr at 249 n.8, 447 P.2d at 361 n.8.
108. Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wn. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440
(1965), noted in 41 WASH. L. REV. 552 (1966).
109. 67 Wn. 2d at 252, 407 P.2d at 443.
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tion exception, and in the course of so doing approved my suggestion
that:11 0
"Liability cannot be imposed when condemnation of the acts or omis-
sion relied upon necessarily brings into question the propriety of gov-
ernmental objectives or programs or the decision of one who, with the
authority to do so, determined that the acts or omission involved
should occur or that the risk which eventuated should be encountered
for the advancement of governmental objectives."
Additional and very persuasive support for the suggestion comes
from Professor Davis, who proposes that the decision of the Supreme
Court of California in Johnson v. State, supra, become the foundation
for further development of the law under the discretionary function
exception of the FTCA."' Professor Jaffe, while critical of certain
aspects of the construction of the discretionary function exception
which I propose, has characterized as "basically sound" the suggestion
that the Government should prove that taking the risk was in fact a
considered element of the discretionary decision.12
IX. OTHER ESSENTIAL REVISIONS
Most of the FTCA's other specifically enumerated exceptions to
governmental liability should be eliminated. These express exceptions
are designed for purposes which can be served adequately by a prop-
erly limited discretionary function provision coupled with the de-
fenses and privileges incorporated in traditional rules of tort law.113
The FTCA now explicitly excludes federal liability for interest prior
to judgment 14 and for punitive damages, 15 as well as liability for
traditional tort claims 1 6 based on assault, battery,11 7 false imprison-
110. 67 Wn. 2d at 254, 407 P.2d at 444, citing Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Act,
31 WASH. L. REV. 207-40 (1956). While it seems that the court erred in applying the test
to the decisions to assign the boy to the "open program" and put him on the boiler de-
tail, its analysis of the discretionary function problem generally is supportive of the sug-
gested language for the FTCA discretionary function execption.
111. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 846-49 (Supp. 1970).
112. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 259 (1965).
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 49-156 (1965).
114. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970). If an award of interest prior to judgment is necessary
to make an injured party whole for all of the loss suffered, retention of the exception
would constitute a departure from the general principles of private tort law.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970). See note 122 infra.
116. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970).
117. The assault and battery exception causes injustice because many courts have
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ment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, 118 libel,
slander, misrepresentation, 11 9 deceit, and interference with contract
rights. 20 Some time ago, Professor Davis concluded that the con-
tinued exclusion of most deliberate torts had been a source of injus-
tice, and that the exceptions should be eliminated from the Act.' 2'
Indeed, the only one of these exceptions that deserves to be retained is
that shielding the federal government from liability for punitive dam-
ages.122 If more protection is needed for specific activities, those activ-
ities should be narrowly stated in particularized exceptions instead of
the present broad language which permits unjustifiable denials of gov-
ernmental liability.
refused to look behind the acts of the assaulting employee to determine whether negli-
gence of other government employees created the occasion for the assault. See Moos v.
United States, 118 F. Supp. 275 (D. Minn. 1954); United States v. Shively, 345 F.2d
294, 297 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965); United States v.
Faneca, 332 F.2d 872, 875 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 971 (1964); Col-
lins v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Pa. 1966). Cf. Pendarvis v. United
States, 241 F. Supp. 8 (E.D.S.C. 1965). But see Rogers v. United States, 397 F.2d 12,
15 (4th Cir. 1968). Without this exception, the government would be protected ade-
quately from excessive liability by common law privileges and by exclusion of
governmental liability for employees' acts committed beyond the scope of employ-
ment.
118. False imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process
do not represent an important area of government exposure. Justice would better be
served by an evaluation of the cases on their merits. See, e.g., Blitz v. Boog, 328 F.2d
596 (2nd Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 855 (1964); Pendarvis v. United States, 241
F. Supp. 8 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
119. Although the Supreme Court has indicated that the exception for misrepre-
sentation should only be allowed to shield the government from liability for
economic harm suffered in business transactions, United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S.
696, 711 n.26 (1961), lower courts have applied it to bar recovery for property
damage, deaths, and personal injuries. See, e.g., National Mfg. Co. v. United
States, 210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967 (1954); Clark v.
United States, 218 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1954); Bartie v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 10
(W.D. La. 1963), affd on other grounds, 326 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1964); Vaughn v.
United States, 259 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Miss. 1966). If the exception for misrepresenta-
tion were eliminated, the principles of private tort law would be very favorable to the
government. See L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 217.01 (1970).
120. The ambiguity of the tort of interference with contract rights almost ensures
uneven and unjust treatment of claimants. Compare Dupree v. United States, 264 F.2d
140 (3rd Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 823 (1959) with Hendry v. United States, 418
F.2d 774 (2nd Cir. 1969).
121. K DAVIS, ADNNisTRArIv LAW TREATISE § 25.08 (Supp. 1970). See also F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 29.13 (1956).
122. Punitive damages paid by the government rather than by its malicious or negli-
gent employees would not perform their usual admonitory or deterrent function unless
the United States was given a right of indemnity. See United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S.
507 (1954) (goverment has no right of indemnity against employee for his misconduct).
Nor would punitive damages serve the basic purpose of redistributing the actual costs of
governmental activity. For a general consideration of the function of punitive damages,
see Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (193 1).
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Moreover, if the FTCA is revised, its coverage should be extended
to claims arising out of National Guard activities.12 3 At present, per-
sons suffering losses as a consequence of National Guard training ac-
tivities obtain relief on claims which do not exceed $15,000 only as a
matter of administrative grace; larger claims may be reported to Con-
gress for further consideration and possible passage of a private bill.1 24
In revising the FTCA, consideration must also be given to the
Drivers Act, 125 a 1961 amendment to the FTCA. Although intended
to provide the equivalent of insurance for government employees for
liabilities incurred while operating private motor vehicles within the
scope of their employment, the Drivers Act in fact adversely affects
both of its intended beneficiaries: injured plaintiffs126 and government
employees. 127
CONCLUSION
The construction given the FTCA in Laird v. Nelms is much to be
regretted and certainly should not be allowed to stand. The rationale
and justification for the imposition of strict or absolute liability upon
123. Although detailed federal standards control National Guard activities [32
U.S.C. §§ 301-714 (1970)], National Guardsmen remain employees of the state and are
not considered federal employees unless they have been ordered into the service of the
United States. Thus the United States has not been held liable under the FTCA for Na-
tional Guardsmen's tortious conduct in training and other activites. See Maryland v.
United States, 381 U.S. 41 (1965). For a history of the statutes governing the National
Guard and its predecessors, see Colby and Glass, The Legal Status of the National
Guard and Its Predecessors, 29 VA. L. REV. 839 (1943); Weiner, The Militia Clause of
the Constitution, 54 HARV. L. REV. 181 (1940).
124. In 1960 Congress enacted the National Guard Tort Claims Act which now
provides for administrative settlement of claims which do not exceed $15,000 and per-
mits Congress to authorize payment of larger amounts. See 32 U.S.C. § 714 (1970).
125. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1970). Pub. L. No. 87-258, Sept. 21, 1961, 75 Stat. 539.
126. Complications result from the fact that the two year Statute of Limitations es-
tablished by 28 U.S.C. § 240 l(d) (1970) is shorter than the limitation period applicable
to negligence actions in many states. See Carr v. United States, 422 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir.
1970). There are enormous difficulties in determining whether a member of the military
forces is acting in the course of his employment while traveling by private vehicle and
on leave pursuant to orders for a change of duty stations. A remedy against the United
States thus may not be available until after the FTCA limitation period has expired. See
L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 216.03(2) (1970); Faix, Altheo Williams
Revisted: "'Line of Duty" Cases--Need for Reconsideration, 26 FED. BAR J. 12, 16-29
(1966); Note, 26 JAG J. 107 (197 1).
127. See, e.g., Gilliam v. United States, 407 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1969), in which a
government employee injured in an automobile accident due to negligence of a fellow
employee acting within the scope of his employment was not allowed to recover under
the FTCA, but was instead allowed only the less comprehensive relief available under
the Federal Employees' Compensation Act.
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one engaging in abnormally dangerous activities find a near perfect
application against the United States. Imposition of such liability
would transfer the inevitable costs of highly dangerous government
activities from the victims upon whom they accidentally fall to the
United States Treasury and ultimately to the general public, for whose
benefit the activities are undertaken. There need be no interference
with the activities of the Government other than tb require it to pay
the allocable costs pursuant to standards generally accepted as just
and supportive of the interests of society.
Unless the FTCA is amended to reject the Laird v. Nelms holding,
its coverage will be greatly reduced. Liabilities will be limited to those
based upon proof of wrongdoing by employees for which the Govern-
ment is liable on a respondeat superior basis. The Government will
not be held liable for many familiar and well established torts, leaving
injured parties with no remedy other than appeal to Congress in a pri-
vate bill. Unless Congress undertakes the burden of considering pri-
vate bills, the business of Government will be carried on without
doing justice to those harmed by its operations. Furthermore, the ne-
cessity of revising the FTCA to reject the Laird v. Nelms rationale
provides the occasion for correction of other errors of the original
draft which time and experience have now disclosed.
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